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Abstract
Government designation of Arabic as a “strategic language” following WWII
transformed Arabic language instruction in U.S. institutions of higher education. Funding from
the government created a shift away from teaching students to read and translate classical Arabic
for academic purposes and toward teaching modern varieties of the language for communication.
I employ a three-pronged institutional analysis that takes into account the role of government, the
role of professional associations, and the role of individual instructors in the redefinition of
norms governing Arabic language instruction during the past seventy years. I find that coercive
pressure stemming from government interest affected Arabic language instruction both directly,
by creating new curricular materials and achievement goals, and indirectly, by facilitating the
professionalization of language instruction and stimulating student demand. Although
professional organizations and student demand mediate coercive pressure to treat Arabic as a
professional skill rather than an academic skill, they continue to promote an agenda supported by
government funding. However, instructors do not perceive student demand or professional norms
as symbolizing government intrusion. My analysis thus suggests that even in the face of
resistance, coercive power can effectively inspire institutional change if it is disguised as
emanating from agents within an organizational field, rather than from an external agent.
Furthermore, a case study of Arabic language instruction illustrates that accounts of institutional
change must take into account power relations, and the potential of professional associations and
individuals to act as partially autonomous agents within an organizational field.
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In January 2006, more than one hundred college presidents and government officials –
including President George W. Bush Jr., and the Secretaries of State, Education, and Defense –
gathered for a two day conference in Washington DC. The conference culminated in the
announcement of the National Security Language Initiative (NSLI) “coordinated by the White
House to dramatically increase the number of Americans learning, speaking, and teaching critical
need foreign languages” (US Department of Education 2008). Since then, government funding
has generated heated debates in academia over whether such funding jeopardizes academic
freedom. Opponents worry that government support undermines the freedom of inquiry and the
ability of scholarship to critically examine government policies (Bowman 2010, Dawson 2007,
Legucha and Tierney 2010). Equally troubling is the possibility that institutions of higher
education will train students in skills that have the potential to be used as a means of asserting
U.S. dominance without questioning the ethical implications of these actions (Pratt 2009, Rafael
2009).
The debate over the introduction of federal funding into Arabic language programs at
U.S. institutions of higher education exemplifies questions about how the coercive power of
government influences the practices of formally autonomous organizations (Lukes 1974, Weber
1978). The fear that government funding undermines the autonomy of teaching professionals at
institutions of education also speaks to debates within sociology concerning the ability of
individuals to retain autonomy in institutional environments (Schmidt 2008, Sewell 1992,
Swidler 1986). As a result, a case study of the effect of government interest in Arabic as a
“strategic” language on Arabic language curriculum at U.S. institutions of higher education is an
ideal topic for examining the ability of current sociological models to account for the influence
of power and individual autonomy on institutional contexts.
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In order to contribute to these contemporary debates, I draw on DiMaggio and Powell’s
(1983) approach to institutional change and stability in order to analyze transformations of the
organizational field of Arabic language instruction in the U.S. Through this case study I highlight
three weaknesses in the application of neo-institutional theory. The first weakness is a
concentration on institutional reproduction instead of instances of institutional transformation
(Hasselbladh and Kallinikos 2000, Ingram 1998). The second weakness is a failure to consider
the effect of coercive power on creation of legitimate professional norms (Powell 2007). The
third weakness is a tendency to focus on one level of analysis (individual, organizational, or
institutional) when attempting to understand periods of institutional change (Schmidt 2008,
Sewell 1992). Drawing on recent literature, I analyze how power and the agency of groups and
individuals influence the transformation of an organizational field. Applying this hypothesis to
the field of Arabic language instruction in the U.S. illustrates that institutional analysis needs to
consider relations between different types of reproduction (coercive, normative, and mimetic)
and different levels of action (individual, organizational, and field). In accounting for these types
of reproduction and levels of action, neo-institutional analyses can highlight how the perceptions
and reactions of actors can contribute to the reorientation of a field.
The first part of my analysis outlines how U.S. government interest in Arabic as a
strategic language resulted in the creation of coercive pressure that attempted to alter the focus of
Arabic language instruction from an academic emphasis to a professional emphasis. I find that
coercive pressure stemming from the government influenced the transformation of the field of
Arabic language instruction in four keys ways: (1) creating Arabic language institutes for
government personnel that required new curriculum and assessment measures, (2) implementing
legislation that provides financial support for the incorporation of new curriculum and
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assessment measures into Arabic language programs at existing institutions of higher education,
(3) supporting the development of professional associations for Arabic language instructors, and
(4) creating lucrative employment opportunities for Americans proficient in contemporary
Arabic language. While the first two mechanisms are familiar forms of government’s coercive
power of the purse, the latter two rely on indirect exercise of government power.
Taking into account the possibility that radical organizational transformation can be
influenced by groups of actors and individual actors, the second part of my analysis discusses
how professional organizations of Arabic language instructors and individual Arabic language
instructors interpreted and contributed to the shift towards teaching Arabic as a professional skill.
I find that professional organizations of Arabic language instructors acted as mediators between
the traditional academic focus of Arabic language instruction and professional focus promoted
by the government in three ways: (1) including speaking and listening skills in the curriculum as
a means to reinforce reading and writing skills, (2) replacing Classical Arabic with Modern
Standard Arabic (MSA) rather than Colloquial Arabic, and (3) adapting government modes of
assessment for use in an academic setting. Thus although coercive pressure influenced the
professional norms created by professional associations of Arabic language instructors, these
associations also adapted the professional focus emphasized by the government in order to
reaffirm the importance of traditional academic skills.
Interviews with individual professors suggest the role that professional organizations
played in mediating government pressure to teach Arabic for professional purposes has obscured
the role that the federal government played in facilitating the curricular shift in Arabic language
instruction at U.S. institutions of higher education. Many instructors viewed U.S. government
pressure to teach Arabic for professional purposes as “illegitimate” and as “contaminating” the
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academic integrity of their field. The same instructors, however, viewed pressure to teach Arabic
for professional purposes as legitimate if the pressure was perceived as stemming from
professional organizations or students. This finding illustrates that the perceptions of individuals
play an important role in legitimatizing the values, norms, and beliefs that are influenced by
coercive pressure.

Theoretical Background
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) provide a framework that allows for an analysis of the
genesis and diffusion of norms that govern organizational life. Rather than focusing on the
aggregate actions of individuals as determinants of organizational activities, they argue that
culture and power influence organizations as social actors. Powell and DiMaggio identify three
sources of pressure that account for the homogenizing effect of culture on institutional practices:
coercive, mimetic, and normative reproduction. Coercive reproduction causes institutions to
resemble one another increasingly as a result of formal or informal pressure by the state or
another actor on which organizations depend. Mimetic reproduction also causes institutional
homogeneity when uncertainty causes institutions to copy one another. Normative reproduction
stems from professionalization, whereby particular organizations and individuals share similar
worldviews and standards of judgment due to institutionalized professional associations and
standardized educational and training backgrounds. All three processes interact to facilitate the
diffusion of shared institutional norms within an “organizational field,” defined by Powell and
DiMaggio as a group of institutions that produce similar products or services.
Powell and DiMaggio’s framework is one of the foundational elements of “new
institutionalism” or “neo-institutionalism” in sociology, which emerged as a response to the
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macro-oriented trend that failed to take into account the “embeddedness” of individuals within
institutional contexts (Nee 1998). While neo-institutionalism provides a valuable reminder of the
importance of social norms in determining institutional practices, the majority of its literature
focuses on mimetic isomorphism, or the process by which the organizational practices of
institutions increasingly homogenize, even in the face of evidence that it lowers efficiency
(Powell 2007). As a result of this emphasis, three corollary criticisms of neo-institutionalism
have emerged. The first criticism is that neo- institutional analysis does not provide a framework
for identifying how and why institutional norms and practices change (Clemens and Cook 1999).
A second critique asserts that the emphasis on social norms and institutional culture overlooks
the role of power in the genesis and diffusion of norms (Powell 2007). The third critique argues
that neo-institutionalism over-emphasizes the role of institutional contexts by painting
individuals as “cultural dopes” who blindly follow predetermined institutional scripts (Schmidt
2008).
Building on these criticisms, a growing body of literature attempts to supplement neoinstitutionalism’s ability to explain institutional change by taking into account power dynamics
and individual agency. For example, Clemens and Cook (1999) argue that the likelihood of
change or durability can be explained by accounting for political factors. Greenwood and
Hinings (2002) call for a combination of “old” and “new” institutional theories that understand
that individuals and institutions are reflexive, choosing courses of action that can result in
change. Similarly, Swidler (1986) and Schmidt (2008) argue that individuals can shape their
environments through choosing from a repertoire of actions made available by their institutional
environment. More recently, Davis, McAdam, Scott and Zald (2005) note the ability of social
movement theory to complement neo-institutional theories that fail to account for the origins of
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new institutional norms. While these authors emphasize different factors in the reorientation of
institutional practices—political influences, the role of individuals, and collective actions that
resemble social movements—the common theme underlying this new thread of literature is the
need to acknowledge that actors and processes connected with power motivate and mediate
institutional processes of change.
Drawing together these ideas three important questions surface. First, how does coercive
pressure interact with professional norms? Second, how does coercive power affect the actions of
actors external to a field? Third, how does the perceived origin of change affect the response of
actors internal to the field? The subsequent paragraphs elaborate how each of these three
questions underscores the importance of considering the role that multiple agents play in
redefining a field as well as the far-reaching – and often invisible – effects of coercive power on
institutional life.

The Intersection of Coercive Pressure and Normative Pressure
In contrast to coercive reproduction, normative reproduction has two distinct
characteristics: from the perspective of actors, professional norms are endogenous to the field,
while coercion is exogenous to the field. As a result, actors within a field may be more likely to
recognize professional norms as legitimate than they are to recognize pressure for change
imposed by a powerful external actor, such as the state, as legitimate. However, as Weber noted,
professionalization involves power and the state, as the state is both the guarantor and regulator
of professional autonomy (1978). Normative reproduction, therefore, may have its origins in
interactions with coercive power. As a result, pressure for change stemming from the state may
be perceived by actors within a field as pressure for change stemming from professionals within
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the field. Since actors are more likely to internalize new norms that are enacted by professional
peers, rather than a powerful external agent, coercive pressure may be more effective when it is
disguised as emanating from a field’s professional community. While established professions can
mediate the implementation of government policies and regulations, their ability to do so may be
undermined if they do not recognize the existence of state pressure within their field (Schumann
and Edelman 1997). Consequently, an analysis of the genesis of norms governing institutional
life must take into account the experiences of actors within a field as well as a broader analysis
of the interaction between coercive pressure and the professionalization of a field.
The Intersection of Coercive Pressure and Mimetic Pressure
Similarly, coercive pressure may also be more effective if actors within a field perceive
impetus for change as stemming from consumers or clients, rather than as a mandate from a
powerful outside actor, such as the state. Whereas mandates for change from the state may be
met with resistance, change may be perceived as legitimate if actors within a field understand it
as a rational response that ensures the field’s survival in times of uncertainty. Coercive pressure
can potentially influence an organization’s response to uncertainty in two ways. First, coercion
may cause changes in the interests of behavior of a field’s clients or customers. For example, a
government policy to change incentives for behavior or awareness of an issue may make
customers or clients of a field change their behavior. Second, coercive power could influence the
perceptions that internal authorities and external audiences have about the legitimacy of
organizations’ practices. Since coercive pressure may affect the desires and evaluations of
consumers and clients, an analysis of the effect of government ideology and legislation on a
particular field would be incomplete without taking into account how coercive pressure affects a
field’s clients and consumers.
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Professionalization and Autonomy
As actors (whether individuals, organizations, or a profession as a whole) react to
pressures, they remake and change a field (Schmidt 2008, Sewell 1992). To understand how
different actors contribute to the re-creation of a field, we must consider how different actors
interpret and interact with changing institutional environments. Instead of viewing
professionalization as undermining professional autonomy (Friedson 1984; Fennel and Leicht
1997), a more nuanced understanding takes into account the autonomy of individual actors
within the profession as well as the profession as a whole. For example, the professionalization
of a field may allow actors the opportunity to collectively define their role in society, while
simultaneously creating normative guidelines that restrain individual actors within the field.
Professionalization, therefore, may increase professional autonomy within a profession as a
whole by concentrating power in organizations or a professional body, while decreasing
individual autonomy. As a result, we must not only consider how professionalization allows a
field to mediate the implementation of government policies and regulations, but also how
professionalization potentially limits the ability of individual actors to challenge the effects of
government legislation (Schumann and Edelman 1997).

Arabic Language as an Ideal Case Study
Arabic language instruction in the U.S. is an ideal topic for exploring the effect of power
on various types of actors within institutions because the field has undergone radical
organizational change, or “frame bending” (Nadler and Tushman 1989). Following the U.S.
government’s designation of Arabic as a strategic language after WWII, the “orientation” of the
Arabic language field transformed from teaching classical Arabic to an emphasis on student
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proficiency in modern varieties of the language (Al-Batal 1995, Abboud 1995, Allen 1992,
McCarus 1992, Miller 1987). Since this large-scale re-organization in U.S. institutions of higher
education stemmed from government pressure, Arabic language instruction provides a unique
opportunity for examining the effect of coercive pressure on professional norms. Furthermore,
since the recent re-orientation of the field remains a contentious issue (Blake and Kramsch
2005), it is possible to consider the role of professional organizations and individual instructors
in the re-creation of institutional norms. Thus, not only does a case study of Arabic language
instruction allow for an analysis of the forces and actors that redefined the field, but it also
provides valuable theoretical contributions to the growing body of literature that aims to enhance
the ability of neo-institutional theory to account for the role of power and non-institutional actors
during periods of institutional change.

Methods
I use three types of data to analyze the mediation of normative trends in Arabic language
instruction: historical analysis of governmental, institutional, and professional influences on
defining curriculum; participant observation at a professional conference for American teachers
of Arabic; and semi-structured interviews with Arabic language instructors. My data provide
insight into how three different types of actors—institutions, professional organizations, and
individual instructors—interpret and influence the standards that determine Arabic language
curriculum. Although I draw on the paradigm of neo-institutional literature to focus on the
organizational field as the unit of analysis (i.e. Arabic language instruction at U.S. institutions of
higher education), my account of institutional change also considers the role of individuals and
professional groups as social agents as well as the power dynamics among these agents.
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I draw on a range of historical evidence to explain the larger socio-political and
organizational environments that have influenced Arabic language instruction in the U.S. I
situate analysis of the content, goals, and implementation of government legislation within the
context of American political developments and more general trends in foreign language
pedagogy at American institutions of higher education. I account for developments in the
professionalization of Arabic language instruction, including the creation of professional
organizations and curricular guidelines. I also draw on publications and reports published by
professional organizations, and on summaries written by Arabic language scholars in the U.S;
these articles provide essential insights into debates about Arabic language curriculum. My
analysis of historical data highlights the central, but mediated, role of government in reforming
Arabic language pedagogy in the U.S.
To gain further insight into the process by which professional organizations mediate
coercive pressure through the creation of professional standards and educational norms, I
attended a professional conference for Arabic language instructors. I sat in on a business meeting
for the professional organization, as well as six panels on the development of Arabic language
curriculum. Approximately 70 Arabic language instructors, representing at least 35 different
programs across a wide range of U.S. institution of higher education, attended at least one of
these seven discussions. My field notes highlight instances of conference participants asking
advice, sharing information, and attempting to shape a professional agenda to provide detailed
insight into the experience and response of Arabic language instructors to pressures to change the
curriculum in both formal and informal contexts. The observation data serve both to check the
accuracy of my interview data, and to examine how the profession might be involved in activities
that influence the extent or direction of change.
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In addition, I conducted fourteen individual interviews with Arabic language instructors
from a wide range of institutions. I recruited ten interview participants over email for interviews
at their home institution, and four participants at a professional conference. These semistructured interviews provide additional insight into historical and contemporary experiences in
creating and implementing curricular design. To determine the forces that instructors perceive as
influencing their profession, I asked participants to discuss their ideal curriculum (content,
pedagogy, and use of class time) and to compare this ideal to the curriculum they currently use.
If participants did not discuss the role of professional organizations, administrative decisions,
government activities, and student motivations, I asked specific follow-up questions to gauge
their experiences of these entities. Interviews ranged from twenty minutes to more than two
hours; most interviews lasted between 45 and 60 minutes. I transcribed and coded all interviews
to identify the influence of coercive, normative, mimetic, and student pressures on decisions
about curriculum.

The Redefinition of Norms Governing Arabic Language Instruction
As the United States increased its international presence during and after WWII, the
ability to communicate in foreign languages became necessary for U.S. security and economic
prosperity. Whereas formerly language instruction occurred within the academic realm,
government interest in foreign language skills expanded the institutional setting of foreign
language instruction as the U.S. government established foreign language institutes in order to
train military and government personnel in “strategic” or “critical” languages. With the National
Defense Education Act (NDEA) in 1958, the government expanded its influence beyond creating
separate institutes for government language into directly funding universities to alter their
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language instruction practices (NDEA 1958). Since 1958, the U.S. federal government has
continuously provided funding for post-secondary “critical language” language programs
through Title VI of the Higher Education Act, The National Language Flagship Program,
Foreign Language and Area Program grants, Boren Scholarships, and the National Security
Language Initiative (JNCL 2009). Interaction between foreign language programs at institutions
of higher education and foreign language programs established and funded by the government
has radically transformed the institutional context of foreign language education in the U.S.
(McCarus 1992).
This new approach to language instruction promoted by government language institutes
challenged the traditional university system of teaching Arabic more than other “strategic”
languages because of Arabic’s unique linguistic situation. In order to understand this idea, a brief
introduction of the history of Arabic languages is necessary. The Islamic conquests of the 7th and
8th centuries established the dominance of the Arabic language across the Middle East, Northern
Africa, and parts of Europe. Although the written form of the language remained standardized in
its original classical form, most likely due to the importance of the Qur’an for many Arabicspeakers, the spoken varieties of the language developed along distinct regional trajectories (Abu
Abasi 1986). However, the spread of the printing press in the 19th and 20th centuries necessitated
a modernized form of Classical Arabic, known as Modern Standard Arabic (MSA). Although
MSA functions as the language of media, literature, and diplomacy, even native Arabic speakers
must receive formal education to gain command of MSA as a spoken and written language. As a
result, use of MSA is restricted to formal contexts while regional varieties of Arabic language
continue to function as the medium of daily life (Chenje 1969). This unique linguistic situation
has sparked intense debates between those who argue that Arabic is an example of diglossia –
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where two varieties of a language exist simultaneously (Ferguson 1959) – or as an example of a
language existing on a continuum – where the correct mode of the language is determined by the
social context of the situation (Meiseles 1980).
Since Arabic language instruction at U.S. colleges and universities traditionally treated
Arabic as a classical language akin to Latin and Greek, the classification of modern Arabic as a
diglossic language or as a language with many shades of formality was irrelevant for language
instruction. However, the increasing trend in foreign language education, spurred by the interest
of the U.S. government, to teach foreign languages for communication demanded a reorientation of the traditional norms of Arabic language instruction. As a result, the switch to a
conversation-based curriculum necessitated a larger change than the curriculum of other critical
languages whose spoken and written forms do not deviate from one another, such as Russian.
The following section outlines how the introduction of a new actor—the U.S.
government—into the realm of Arabic language instruction involved four causal influences that
fundamentally altered the pedagogical and philosophical methods of instruction (Ingram 1998).
First, government policy influenced the learning outcomes for Arabic language programs at
universities. Second, coercive pressure from funding led to the formation of Arabic language
programs that serve as models for other institutions. Third, by facilitating the establishment of
professional associations, government actions altered and increased the normative pressures
facing Arabic language instruction. Fourth, by stimulating student demand and by making
instruction more responsive to student demand, government indirectly amplified market-like
mimetic influences. In the following paragraphs, I explain how these causal influences developed
and then describe how these influences related to one another.
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Re-defined Learning Outcomes
Following WWII, the U.S. government designated Arabic as a “strategic language”
because of the increasing importance of Middle-Eastern oil for the U.S. economy and the
potential of Arabic-speaking countries to develop communist governments (McCarus 1992). As
with other foreign language institutes developed by the U.S. government, the desired learning
outcome of government language institutes did not align with the traditional goals of foreign
language education at institutions of higher education. Whereas universities traditionally taught
Arabic as an academic skill for translation of ancient and medieval academic, religious, and
literary texts, government language institutes were established to teach government personnel
Arabic in order to facilitate international communication. As a result, academic programs
emphasized reading and writing skills while government language institutes emphasized
listening and speaking skills (Allen 1992).
Since the desired learning outcome for government language institutes—communicative
proficiency—differed from the traditional desired learning outcome for institutions of higher
education—translation and interpretation of Classical texts—government language institutes
required the creation of curricula and assessment measures that emphasized the ability to
communicate in formal Arabic (MSA) and informal Arabic (colloquial) (McCarus 1992). While
traditional university curriculum was based on a “grammar-translation” approach that
emphasized grammar and reading skills, government language institutes developed new
language learning pedagogies such as the “audio-lingual method” and the “communicative
method” to support curriculum based on developing communicative proficiency (Al-Batal 1995).
Similarly, the U.S. government developed an assessment tool to measure students’
communicative proficiency, known as the “Foreign Service Interview” Test. These developments
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were especially influential for Arabic language instruction, because testing oral proficiency
forced language instructors to confront the issue of diglossia (Rammuny 1995). In summary, the
emergence of government language institutes as a new site in the field of Arabic language
instruction allowed for the emergence of a new set of norms defining the purposes of Arabic
language education (Ingram 1998).

The Formation of Arabic Language Programs that Serve as Model Institutions
Until federal funding became available through legislation such as NDEA and Title VI,
government language institutes and U.S. universities existed in isolation from one another.
Federal funding for institutions of higher education, however, created three means for the
learning goals developed at government language institutes to alter the traditional curricular
practices of Arabic language instruction at U.S. universities: (1) development of standard
curricular materials, (2) establishing uniform standards of evaluating student learning, and (3)
inserting government-based curricular goals into the academy. Three examples of government
initiatives to form model institutions illustrate each of these elements of government influence.
The NDEA-funded Middlebury Summer Language Institute pioneered an approach for
integrating speaking and listening skills into Arabic language programs in institutions of higher
education. Since the institute required students to pledge to speak only in Arabic for the duration
of the program, the institute had to create a curriculum that would allow students to communicate
outside of the classroom. Rather than teaching students to communicate in a regional variety of
spoken Arabic, Middlebury professors chose to follow the emergent trend established by
government language institutions to teach students to communicate in MSA (Abboud 1995). But
since MSA is not a spoken language for informal conversations anywhere in the Arabic-speaking
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world and is typically only used for formal topics (Eligbali and Taha 1995), the Middlebury
Arabic Language curriculum facilitated the creation of a new form of Arabic language
specifically for beginning Arabic language students. The Middlebury curriculum developed the
textbook Al-Kitaab fii Ta'allum al-'Arabiyya (also known as Al-Kitaab), which is now the
dominant textbook in the field.
The Center for Arabic Study Abroad (CASA) program, supported by federal funding and
coordinated through the University of Texas, also influenced Arabic language curriculum norms
by establishing standards by which to judge top students across institutions. The CASA program
is intended to offer advanced level training in Arabic and admission to the CASA program is
determined by performance on a proficiency test. Since this test includes assessment of ability to
speak and listen in MSA, institutions of higher education that wanted to give their students the
opportunity to participate in this prestigious program had to instruct students in reading and
speaking MSA (McCarus 1992).
Finally, the National Language Flagship Program (NFLP), the most recent government
funded initiative, provides grants to institutions of higher education to enhance existing programs
in “critical languages” as well as individual grants to undergraduate and graduate students to
continue their language study abroad. In addition to creating a new generation of professionals to
enhance U.S economic and security goals abroad, the National Language Flagship Program aims
to “lead the nation in designing, supporting, and implementing a new paradigm for advanced
language education” (U.S. Department of Education 2008). In order to facilitate the professional
focus of institutions of higher education, grant money is designated for the creation of courses
such as “Business Arabic” or “Media Arabic.” Students receiving Arabic language flagship
funding are also required to learn a dialect in addition to MSA, a tradition that originated with
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government language initiatives. Grant money supports the creation of new curriculum for
promoting professional skills in Arabic language, on the condition that curricular developments
are “diffused” throughout the academic community by means of publication or public
presentation at conferences and/or teacher workshops (U.S. Department of Education 2008).
Furthermore, institutions that receive flagship programs are required to develop partnerships with
local secondary schools to increase their ability to advance students language skills for
professional purposes.

The Professionalization of the Arabic Language Field
Government interest has also influenced Arabic language instruction at institutions of
higher education by facilitating the professionalization of the discipline through the funding of
conferences for Arabic language teaching professionals. Annual conferences funded by NEDA
from 1962 to 1967 played a particularly important role in the professionalization of the field,
bringing together Arabic language instructors from across the country in a setting focused on
pedagogy rather than scholarship. Three developments emerged from these conferences that
fundamentally altered the normative method of Arabic language instruction in institutions of
higher education. First, instructors attending the workshop unanimously agreed that students
should begin their study of Arabic language with MSA, rather than beginning with the classical
Arabic of the Qur’an and medieval texts (McCarus 1992). Second, the instructors in attendance
developed a framework for the creation of a new textbook that focused on speaking and listening
in addition to reading and writing: Elementary Modern Standard Arabic became the standard
textbook for Arabic language instruction in the U.S. until Al-Kitaab, which also was funded
partially by a federal grant (Allen 1992, Belnap 1995). Third, these conferences gave rise to the
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first professional association for Arabic language instruction, the American Association of
Teachers of Arabic (AATA) (Abboud 1995). To this day, AATA supports and facilitates the
professionalization of the field by connecting Arabic language instructors at an annual
convention, publishing an annual journal on emergent trends in Arabic language education, and
by providing formal and informal settings for teachers to interact and shape their teaching
practices in light of others (Al-Batal 1995, Allen 1992).
As a result of the introduction of standardized curriculum and assessment mechanisms
created by the professionalization of the Arabic language field, teacher-training has become an
important asset in the field. The federal government has aided in the development of teachertraining by administering workshops that allow government members to teach instructors at
institutions of higher education how to administer the Foreign Service Interview test, originally
developed for government personnel in order to test communicative proficiency. Government
funding is also used to assist the developing teacher-certification programs at institutions of
higher education (U.S. Department of Education 2008). Before the introduction of standardized
methods for testing Arabic language skills, there was not a pressing need to train teachers
because they were able to draw from a variety of non-standard classical texts for translation
(Allen 1995). However, the increasing standardization of techniques for language instruction has
spurred the creation of more systematic certification programs for Arabic Language Instruction
at the American University in Cairo, the University of Michigan, and the University of Texas
(Belnap 1995). By increasing the relevance of teaching certification programs, government
interest in Arabic language instruction created a salient means for the diffusion of new
pedagogical norms.
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Increasing Student Demand
Federal government funding has also indirectly influenced the norms of Arabic language
instruction by increasing student interest in Arabic. From 1960 to 2009 the number of students
enrolled at Arabic language programs at institutions of higher education grew from 451 to
35,083, while the number of students enrolled in all foreign languages has decreased (Furman,
Goldberg, and Lusin 2010). Surveys that document student motivation for learning Arabic
language show that the relatively small number of students studying Arabic for the purpose of
translating classical texts has stayed fairly constant; the rising demand comes from students
taking Arabic either as a means to enhance their chances of employment, or, in the case of
heritage students, as a means to enhance their connection to an ancestral culture (Belnap 1987,
2006). Not only is the U.S. government desperate for American-born speakers to work for the
Department of Defense, Homeland Security, or in intelligence, but NGOs and businesses are also
eager to employee individuals able to communicate in MSA and regional dialects, due to the
increased interaction of the private sector with government-based programs in Arabic-speaking
regions (Belnap 2006).

Summary
Government initiatives have transformed Arabic language instruction in the United
States. While forms of direct involvement in curriculum and funding model programs have been
influential, the scope of government influence has increased due to the indirect normative and
mimetic pressures that resulted from other government actions. By providing a structure for the
formation of professional associations and networks, the government increased the extent and
depth of professional norms. These professional norms can increase the likelihood and speed of
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the diffusion of changes, such as practices of standardizing textbooks or reinforcing status
hierarchies of programs. Government designation of Arabic as a strategic language has also
stimulated a demand for students trained in Modern Standard Arabic as a communicative skill,
thus indirectly reinforcing the influence of government funding by shifting the interests typical
of students in learning the language.

How Professional Organizations and Arabic Language Instructors Receive New Norms
Recent literature suggests that through collective action, groups of individuals within an
institutional field can work collectively to change the norms that govern their field (McAdam
and Scott 2005). Similarly, literature also suggests that individuals enjoy a reflexive relationship
with their institutional environments: although institutional contexts may determine the options
available to individual actors within the field, individuals retain the agency to choose from this
array of options (Sewell 1992, Schmidt 2008, Swidler 1986). Since the analysis thus far
emphasizes how coercive pressure from the government has shaped the institutional context of
Arabic language instruction, the remainder of my analysis will focus on how individuals interact
with and interpret their transformed institutional environment. By taking into account the
potential reflexive relationships between individuals and institutions, the second half of my
analysis can explain the hidden role of coercive power in the transformation of Arabic language
instruction. The remainder of the analysis is divided into two sections. First, I discuss how
professional organizations of Arabic language instructors responded to the norms imposed upon
the field by government language institutes. Second, I examine how professors interpret and
respond to pressure for curricular change.
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The Role of Professional Organizations in the Transformation of Arabic Language Instruction
Professional organizations of language instructors provided the profession with the leverage
needed to negotiate the imposition of norms developed at government language institutes.
Instead of simply accepting norms advanced by coercive pressure, professional organizations
strategically adapted elements of norms stemming from government language programs in order
to reinforce select traditional practices. Professional groups adapted the government goals in
three key ways: (1) replacing the traditional language of instruction, classical Arabic, with
Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) rather than a dialect, (2) including speaking and listening skills
in the curriculum as a means to enforce reading and writing skills, and (3) adapting government
modes of assessment for use in an academic setting.
First, participants in the government-funded teacher workshops in the 1960s discussed
above created instruction standards that neither maintained the traditional mode of instruction
nor adopted the government norm of teaching colloquial dialects. Instead, they advocated for the
use of MSA in the classroom (Allen 1992). Designating MSA as the standard for language for
beginning instruction allowed instructors to continue using the traditional grammar-translation
approach because MSA retains the grammatical structures of classical Arabic to a much larger
degree than dialects and because MSA is the language of the written press and modern Arabic
literature (Chenje 1969). The adoption of MSA as the standard for instruction, rather than
colloquial Arabic which is used in the Arabic speaking world for informal conversations, also
illustrates how Arabic language professionals resisted the pressure to completely abandon the
traditional emphasis on grammar and translation.
Second, rather than completely abandoning the traditional grammar-translation method
and its focus on reading and writing, groups of professionals at the government-sponsored
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meetings in 1965–67 advocated concurrently providing instruction in all four skills: reading,
writing, speaking, and listening. As a result, the Arabic language instructors at these teacher
workshops conceptualized a textbook that focused heavily on grammar and the translation skills,
but also incorporated conversational elements and audio materials (McCarus 1992). The
textbook that resulted, Elementary Modern Standard Arabic, became the standard textbook in
Arabic language classrooms in institutions of higher education (Belnap 1995). Elementary
Modern Standard Arabic included instruction in speaking and listening in a way that enforced
the traditionally emphasized skills of grammar, translation, and reading (Rammuni 1995). Thus,
professional organizations of Arabic language professors served as a buffer for the imposition of
instruction norms developed at government language institutes.
Third, in order to combat the pressure to mold their curriculum to mirror the learning
outcome goals of government language institutes, professional associations of language
instructors adapted the Foreign Service Interview test for use in an academic setting. In 1967, the
Modern Language Association (MLA) formed the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign
Languages (ACTFL) “to function as a national organization for language teachers based on
pedagogy of language separate from literary criticism” (ACTFL 1982). The creation of ACTFL
as a professional body symbolized a break from the traditional philosophy of integrating the
study of translation and literature into foreign language instruction. However, although the
emergence of ACTFL validated foreign language instruction as an academic field independent of
literary studies, the focus of ACTFL on developing suitable modes of proficiency testing
appropriate for higher education also symbolized a resistance to the unabridged adoption of
government language standards. The proficiency standards promoted by ACTFL incorporate five
skills: speaking, listening, reading, writing, and culture (ACTFL 1982). After the first ACTFL
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guidelines issued in 1982, government assessment procedures have also included a component
for assessing cultural competency, demonstrating that the diffusion of norms created in the
academic language community language can also influence the norms of government language
institue.
In summary, the imposition of language instruction norms developed by government
language institutes threatened to impinge upon the autonomy of Arabic language professors in
institutions of higher education. However, the emergence of professional organizations of Arabic
professors, ironically facilitated by government funding, allowed for reciprocal influence in the
definition of norms during times of increasing demand for Arabic language instruction. This
finding challenges accounts of professionalization as undermining the autonomy of professionals
(Friedson 1984, Fennel and Leicht 1997). Instead my analysis suggests that professional
organizations can serve as a means of reasserting and retaining professional autonomy in the face
of coercive pressure for reform.

Instructor Interpretation of the Forces Driving the Transformation of Arabic Language
Instruction
Professors experienced the transformation of Arabic language instruction as a shift away
from language learning as an intellectual project for furthering academic study, and toward
language learning as an applied skill for furthering employment prospects. Instructors were
divided as to whether they considered this shift as negative or positive. For example, one
instructor complained:
It’s a new shift to get a master’s degree at an institution only for languages, rather than
literature or political science where the language is embedded in its natural home, or
academic home. Now it’s about getting Arabic so that we can teach students who want to
work for the government or security careers … language is shorn out of its context.
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Although some professors bemoaned the new norm of teaching Arabic separate from its
traditional academic context, all interviewees viewed the shift as permanent. Instead of returning
to the traditional method of teaching beginning students Classical Arabic, professors who
advocated the importance of learning classical Arabic for academic purposes suggested the
creation of higher-level courses for these purposes. Similarly, instructors who felt that more
grammar should be emphasized in the curriculum advocated using skits and oral dialogues to
reinforce these skills. In sum, instructors’ reaction to the change (adapting new curriculum
standards to include opportunities to learn classical Arabic for academic purposes, rather than
attempting to dismantle the new model of teaching MSA for communication) exemplifies the
general consensus among the instructors that the new norms governing Arabic language
instruction are both permanent and legitimate.

Government Funding. Professors expressed mixed sentiments concerning government funding
for Arabic language programs at institutions of higher education. One professor viewed
government funding as “contaminating the integrity of [her university].” Similarly, another
professor expressed discomfort at the integration of government training and higher education:
“I’m not against us having well-trained people in intelligence, I just don’t want the university to
be involved in that process. It’s like separation of church and state, it doesn’t mean I’m for one
and against the other, but just, you know, they’re better kept apart.” Other professors saw
government funding as providing a “valuable opportunity” for collaboration between Arabic
instructors and the government. For example, at a professional conference, one instructor urged
his colleagues to view the government’s interest in Arabic as an opportune moment to expand
their programs and positively impact the government’s agenda abroad:
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This is an opportunity moment…. right now there is this imperative for military officers to
be trained in languages and cultures to a much higher level so that they can be effective with
collaborating with others to head off potential problems…(We need to) open ourselves up to
translating and talking across divides that before might have seemed like traitors to our
profession, we’ve got some allies in interesting places, and very influential allies in
interesting places… (if we collaborate) we have a much better chance of seeing a better
world.

Although this professor acknowledged that members of the profession would traditionally view
Arabic instructors that collaborated with the government as “traitors to [the] profession,” he
implores instructors to see collaboration as a positive opportunity for the field to positively
impact U.S. foreign policy. Even though the issue of government funding for Arabic language
programs at institutions of higher education remains a heated debate within the profession (Blake
& Kramsch 2005), only one of the instructors interviewed viewed the U.S. government as having
had a transformative effect on the profession. In spite of the role that government funding and
interest have played in significantly changing the goals and pedagogical practices of the
profession, Arabic language instructors do not perceive the government as having had a coercive
effect on Arabic language programs at U.S. universities. Instead, professors identified the
transformation as stemming from two sources: professional organizations and students.

Professional Organizations. All of the professors interviewed experienced curricular change as
stemming from ACTFL, a professional organization for teachers of foreign languages.
Specifically, professors pointed to ACTFL’s role in publishing student language learning goals
as the source the field’s transformation. One professor noted in a manner typical of many
interview participants: “It was the introduction of ACTFL and the whole proficiency guidelines
and communicative competence that came into the field and led to a different set of priorities …”
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In this telling, the government’s role in initiating the changes (and spurring the development of
ACTFL) disappears. Rather, ACTFL is the actor that “came into the field” to change priorities.
While all instructors interviewed saw ACTFL and the professionalization of the field as
the agents of change, not all instructors viewed the norms advanced by these institutions as
positive. In spite of negative feelings however, all professors but one continued to follow the
professional norms prescribed by these organizations. For example, even though all the
instructors interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the Al-Kitaab, all but one professor used
the textbook in their MSA courses because they felt it provided unification for Arabic language
classes both within their home institution and throughout the field. Because each semester
functioned as a “stepping-stone for the following level,” professors argued that a standard
textbook was necessary. Across the profession, professors understood Al-Kitaab as part of an
informal set of guidelines that connected instructors and students of Arabic:
There are unifying factors [between institutions] and those are the textbooks that are used,
the standard contact hours per week... networking between people who work in the field of
teaching Arabic, the contacts that exist between universities, the instructors know each other,
attending conferences, reading about language in journals… we talk to each other... “What
do you guys do at your university during the first semester? We’re both using the same book
how many lessons do you cover? Ah…. You cover that many, hm… maybe we should cover
a bit less or more…” these establish certain guidelines for the profession.

The fact that textbooks serve as an informal unifying force between programs was underscored
by the situation of the only instructor interviewed who did not use Al-Kitaab for MSA
instruction. In addition to being the only Arabic language instructor at his university, he was also
not connected to the larger field of Arabic language instructors at institutions of higher
education, nor did he offer ACTFL proficiency testing for his students. In summary, although
professional associations for Arabic language instructors allowed the profession as a whole to
retain professional autonomy, the pressure that instructors felt to use an “unsatisfactory”
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textbook illustrates how the professionalization of the field has undermined the autonomy of
individual instructors. In spite of their individual preferences, professors followed the
“guidelines” established by professional associations in order to maintain legitimacy in the eyes
of their students, the department, and the field as a whole.
Whereas all of the professors interviewed that were not heads of their Arabic language
programs did not feel able to influence the curriculum at their home institution, they viewed
ACTFL as an arena as an arena where individual instructors could inspire curricular change. For
example, one instructor mentioned that he became actively involved with ACTFL so that he
could shape the “dominant ideology” of his home program. In order to push his home institution
to teach MSA and a form of colloquial Arabic concurrently, this professor helped modify
ACTFL’s Arabic guidelines to require that students navigate a continuum between formal and
informal Arabic. Although he felt powerless to shape the curriculum at his home institution as an
instructor, he was confident that the revised proficiency standards would influence his
institution’s curriculum in spite of his colleague’s resistance: “The changes are not sitting well
with everybody, but … in the next revised ACTFL, they will be there for Arabic, and that will
impact the curriculum.” The instructor’s assurance that the proficiency guidelines will be
influential, in spite of resistance, reflects the belief that shaping ACTFL decisions is the most
effective means to shape curriculum. Furthermore, the faith expressed by this instructor that
changing testing rubrics will affect instructional practices at even resistant institutions, suggests
that this instructor himself feels that standardized proficiency guidelines prevent him from using
strategic “decoupling” in order to resist pressure for change.
These findings indicate that the government’s role in initiating and fostering the changes
in curriculum have become invisible to a large proportion of professors. While professionals
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express conflicted feelings about accepting government funding, they do not view the funding as
affecting the Arabic language curriculum in the universities. Instead, conflicts within
institutions—whether about appropriate pedagogy within a department or about the relative
status of language instruction—are viewed as profession-level problems. Instructor responses to
these problems emphasize managing the situations by supplementing the dominant framework,
rather than undermining it, demonstrating that the transformation of Arabic language instruction
is accepted as both permanent and legitimate. Furthermore, these findings indicate that while the
professionalization of the field of Arabic language instruction allows the profession as a whole to
retain autonomy, instructor’s autonomy is undermined by pressure to adhere to professional
norms.

Student Demand.

In addition to professional associations, all of the instructors identified

student demand as an important contributor to the transformation of Arabic language instruction.
For example, one instructor noted “prior to ten years ago, Arabic was kind of isolated… it was
studied by scholars in academia to read texts and so most departments focused on that need.
Whereas with the expanding interest in Arabic, the desire for people to go overseas and use the
language, has transformed the equation.” This instructor, like others, noted that the new wave of
students is interested in using Arabic for professional, rather than academic, purposes. Indeed, all
fourteen Arabic language instructors whom I interviewed emphasized that student preferences
influenced their departments’ curriculum decisions and what materials they chose to emphasize
in the classroom. Although the professors often inferred that the events of September 11th
affected language curriculum at institutions of higher education, none explicitly commented on
the connection between government employment opportunities and student demand.
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Professors who remained skeptical of government funding at their home institutions
justified its use by citing the goals of their students. Professors whose institutions received
funding asserted that government funding allowed their program to “develop in ways that we
would have wanted to develop anyways.” Instructors also noted that government funding
encouraged students and “provided students who would be interested in [Arabic] anyways with
more of a reason to stick with it.” In other words, although professors were resistant to the use of
government force to shape their universities’ curriculua, professors eagerly acquiesced to student
desires even though these aligned with the goals of the government. For example, an instructor
conflicted about government funding for university language programs justified her university’s
participation by emphasizing that the program benefited students with a variety of goals:
A lot of non-flagship students are taking classes that are designed for flagship, say the
media-class, that’s an ideal thing for [students hoping to work in intelligence] but it’s also an
ideal thing for anybody to take in Arabic unless all you want to do is medieval Islamic texts
in Arabic and you want an academic graduate degree…

Although this professor feels that the Department of Defense compromised the integrity of her
institution, she defends its existence by referencing student demand. Furthermore, she draws a
division between the skills sought by students interested in “medieval Islamic texts” for
academic positions, and the skills sought by the new generation of students. Whereas in the late
20th century the government had to push for an incorporation of new curriculum goals,
institutions of higher education are now incorporating these curriculum goals independently as a
response “student demand” and “student interest.”
There are two reasons that instructors may be more open to influence stemming from
students than the government, even when the two forces are attempting to shape the curriculum
similarly. The first is that professors saw student enrollment as an important source of leverage
for obtaining the respect and financial resources of the university. At both the professional
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association’s business meeting and a panel discussion, participants emphasized the importance of
documenting student success in order to demonstrate to potential students and university
administrators that Arabic language programs are an important asset to the university:
We need to make the compelling case that [Arabic language instructors] add value to the
university, that we attract more students to programs… there is some good research coming
out of late that shows deans that language programs are money makers…and qualitative
documentation of what we do is the most persuasive.

The current financial instability of universities has made professors acutely aware of the need to
defend their utility to the university administrators and promote their programs to students
hoping to increase their employment prospects after college.
The second reason that professors may be more responsive to pressure stemming from
student demand than pressure stemming from the government is that instructors felt that they
could shape students’ development whereas many professors felt powerless to shape government
initiatives abroad. For example, one professor remarked that many students pursing Arabic to
work in the government become “disenchanted” about the career that they had imagined “after
their experience [studying Arabic].” Many of the instructors who learned Arabic as a second
language themselves remarked upon the transformative effect of study abroad on their
understanding of Arab life and culture. One professor who was particularly ambivalent about
universities providing training in Arabic to students who would go on to use it for intelligence or
military purposes noted her hope that learning Arabic would change her students’ minds:
I have [a student who wants to work for the government] right now. He tells me “I like to
study [colloquial] better than [MSA] because I feel I can communicate more in it, with you
and others around me.” (pause) But he doesn’t work for the government yet, so he’s already
been positively affected by Arabic.

Professors see the potential to exert influence on students’ subsequent decisions, indirectly
influencing government actions. Conversely, the majority of professors felt powerless to shape
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the government’s actions. As a result of this belief, changes that would meet resistance from
instructors if seen as mandated by government funding may not reach resistance when stemming
from students because instructors retain a sense of professional control. However, since
increasing enrollments in Arabic are from students wanting to work in the professional sector
(Belnap 2006), instructor willingness to acquiesce to student demand means that students act as
agents that legitimate the coercive pressure that stems from the norms defined by government
language institutes.

Summary
The second half of this analysis reveals that, even if actors within a field do not perceive
it, coercive power can affect the creation of professional norms that govern an institution.
Although professional organizations of Arabic language instructors established the use of Arabic
as a communicative language in institutions of higher education as a result of coercive pressure
resulting from government funding, instructors do not perceive the transformation of Arabic
language curriculum as stemming from government pressure. Instead, instructors identify
professional organizations and student demand as the factors motivating the radical reorientation of the field. Although government interest remains a contentious issue within the
profession, its influence on the re-orientation of learning goals is invisible to Arabic language
instructors. Believing that pressure for change is a result of the professionalization of the
language and student demand, instructors do not challenge changes to the traditional curriculum
that they would if they identified it as coming from the government. The hidden nature of
coercive influence in the Arabic language field thus has played a significant role in its successful
transformation.
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The second half of this paper also suggests that although professors may feel the ability
to influence curriculum decisions when functioning as part of a larger community of Arabic
language professors, such as ACTFL or AATA, as individuals, instructors feel powerless to
challenge the standardized curriculum developed by professional associations. Although
professional associations partially preserve the autonomy of the profession by acting as a body
that can negotiate coercive pressures, the interview data suggest that this professional autonomy
comes at the expense of the autonomy of individual instructors.

Discussion
An in-depth understanding of the genesis and legitimization of these norms illustrates that
coercive pressure is far-reaching and multi-faceted and that a given field is shaped by the
interaction between many types of social actors (organizations, professional groups, individuals).
Specifically, my analysis highlights that the introduction of the U.S. government into the field of
Arabic language instruction resulted in coercive pressure to create curriculum focused on
professional skills, rather than academic inquiry. The use of government funding for the creation
of curriculum and assessment materials and for the creation of “model” Arabic language
programs constituted a direct form of coercive pressure. Coercive pressure also affected Arabic
language instruction in more subtle and indirect ways, such as facilitating the professionalization
of the field and stimulating student demand. While Arabic language instructors were aware of
direct manifestations of coercive power, indirect manifestations were perceived as stemming
from professional organizations or student demand.
I have demonstrated the role played by various actors in the creation, mediation, and
diffusion of norms governing Arabic language instruction at U.S. institutions of higher
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education. Professional organizations of Arabic teachers resemble social movements in that they
actively mediate between two norms. Although this mediation preserved the autonomy of the
professional as a whole, the professionalization of the Arabic language field undermines the
autonomy of individual instructors. The ambivalence of individual instructors toward
government influence in the field suggests that instructors would resist the implementation of
emergent norms if they were not sanctioned by professional organizations. Ironically,
professional organizations have introduced coercive pressures into the field independently of the
government, masking their true origins and preventing instructor resistance. It follows that
coercive pressure may be most effective when it is disguised as stemming from professional
organizations or market-like pressures stemming from student demand. Therefore, analyses of
institutional change that fail to look at the intersection of coercive, normative, and mimetic
pressures may fail to isolate the most powerful influences that promote change.
Since the goal of this case study is to provide a glimpse into the process by which
coercive power influences the creation and diffusion of new norms in a field, the findings are not
drawn from a large enough pool for conclusions to be made about the profession as a whole. As
a result, the power differentials within the field of Arabic language instruction were beyond the
scope of this paper. In order to understand more fully how coercive elements affect the creation
of professional norms, an analysis of specific dominant actors within the field of Arabic
language instruction would also be necessary. Another avenue for further research would be a
comparative analysis, investigating the characteristics of fields that are susceptible to coercive
pressure. Since Arabic language is a newly established field within most universities, it may be
more vulnerable to influence from coercive pressures in comparison to more established fields,
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such as French language instruction. It would be fruitful to analyze and compare how other
fields of language instruction respond to coercive and mimetic pressures.
An unexpected finding is the role played by students in determining curriculum. As
institutions of higher education increasingly resemble corporations, where students function as
consumers and teachers function as sellers, Arabic language instructions increasingly find
themselves forced to cater to the needs and desires of students (Kaatz & Zajac 1993, Stick 2003).
The influence of rapidly rising student demand for Arabic language instruction is an area of
research that deserves more attention. It is possible that student demand has a powerful effect on
curriculum design in Arabic language because of the indirect forces of coercive pressure that
support student goals. Conversely, it is possible that student desire influences curriculum design
in departments throughout institutions of higher education. Once again, comparing Arabic
language instruction with a field that does not experience coercive pressure at the university
would answer questions about the effect of student demand in the university as a whole.
To return to the heated debates surrounding the National Security Language Initiative
(NSLI), my analysis illustrates that the effect of coercive pressure stemming from government
interest in Arabic language instruction is far-reaching and often invisible. While claims that
initiatives such as NSLI are “militarizing” higher education may be exaggerated (Giroux 1998),
it is important to recognize that the effects of government entry into education are multi-faceted
even if actors do not recognize them. While actors may be ideologically opposed to government
intervention within a field, they may not detect the influence of government action on
professional norms and consumer (student) demands. As a result, coercive pressure can
successfully alter a field in accordance with government priorities in ways that become invisible
to actors within the field. Since Arabic language instructors do not perceive the effect of coercive
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pressure stemming from the government on their field, the operation of power in and through the
field is obscured. These processes could result in government priorities becoming hegemonic
forces, since actors in the field may not recognize or challenge the underlying beliefs and
priorities that motivate processes of institutional change (Ewick and Silbey 1998).
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